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Somewhat Frantic: A Brief Response to Crime,
Punishment, and Romero
Michael Vitiello
1. INTRODUCTION

I first encountered an article appearing in the Duquesne Law
Review, entitled Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An Analysis of
the Case Against California's Three Strikes Law,' when
researching for a book review of a new book regarding the
California Three Strikes Law. 2 In the article, authors Janiskee and
Erler make a number of remarks about my work that call for a
3
response.
In this response, I would like to reply to claims that Janiskee and
Erler made about my position on Three Strikes. The co-authors'
criticism of my position is twofold. First, although my position is
quoted accurately, i.e., that Three Strikes "passed as a result of
4
public panic, flamed by politicians who spurned rational debate,"
they offer my position as an example of opposition to Three Strikes
that they characterize as "somewhat frantic." Second, the authors
fault both Zinring and myself for suggesting that "[s]uch
fundamental issues as crime and punishment should be left to
7
experts."6 Apparently, this position makes us "radical reformers"
and anti-democratic in our views. Specifically, they contend that
"[uintil the rule of experts replaces democracy, however, radical
1. Brian P. Janiskee and Edward J. Erler, Crime, Punishment, and Romero: An
Analysis of the Case Against California'sThree Strikes Law, 39 DUQ. L REV. 43 (2000).
2.

FRANKuN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKiNS, AND SAM KAMIN, PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY:

THREE STRIES AND YOU'RE OUT IN CAuFoRNIA (2001); my review of that book is entitled
Punishment and Democracy: A Hard Look at Three Strikes' Overbloum Promises,
Punishment and Democracy: Three Strikes and You're Out in California, Franklin E.
Zimring, Gordon Hawkins and Sam Kamin, reviewed by Michael Vitiello (to appear in CAL
L REv. January 2002).
3. I was pleased to learn that Professor Zimring was also responding to remarks about
his work.
4. Janiskee and Erler, supra note 1, at 54 (quoting Michael Vitiello, "Three Strikes" and
the Romero Case: The Supreme Court Restores Democracy, 30 Loy. LA L REv. 1643, 1652

(1997)).
5.

Id.

6.
7.

Id. at 55.
Id. at 56.
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reformers are confined by the forms of democracy."8
While I disagree with a number of positions that the co-authors
take in their article, I confine my remarks to their attacks on my
position.9 My first point is that, despite their willingness to make an
ad hominem attack, they do not engage in any effort to address the
content of my article, that Three Strikes was the result of public
panic and the failure of politicians to engage in rational debate. My
second point overlaps somewhat with my first point, but goes well
beyond a discussion of passage of Three Strikes. The co-authors'
suggestions that a rule of experts is "radical" and that our system is
a popular democracy are simply wrong. Their mistake is
fundamental; ours is a republican form of government precisely
because the framers of the Constitution feared mob rule. As a
result, our system frequently insulates important policy decisions
from popular passions.
II.

MEETING THE ARGUMENT

In Crime, Punishment and Romero, the co-authors not only
failed to meet my argument fairly, they made no effort to address
the argument at all. Instead, they dismissed the point with an ad
hominem attack.
Two separate articles of mine on the Three Strikes legislation
have addressed the circumstances surrounding passage of Three
Strikes. 10 Those articles concluded that the enactment of Three
Strikes was the result of "public panic, flamed by politicians who
spumed rational debate."" Readers can digest all of the support for
that position in those two articles. Here, I offer a brief summary of
8. Id.
9. For example, the authors discuss whether sentences under Three Strikes may
violate the federal and state constitutional prohibitions against excessive sentences. Janiskee
and Erler, supra note 1, at 56-60. While the authors do recognize that the language of the
Eighth Amendment of the Federal Constitution differs from California's constitutional
provisions, their discussion of Three Strikes considers only United States Supreme Court
authority and ignores developed case law interpreting the California Constitution. Id. In fact,
as interpreted by the courts, the California Constitution provides more protection against
excessive sentences than the case law interpreting the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., In re
Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410 (1972); People v. Wmgo, 14 Cal. 3d 169 (1975); People v. Dillon, 34 Cal.
3d 441 (1983). Further, the authors fail to recognize the significance of the difference in
textual language. The Eighth Amendment prohibits "cruel and unusual punishment," while
CALi CONST. art. I, § 17 prohibits "cruel or unusual punishment", which in fact supports the
California court's more liberal reading of its constitutional provision.' In addition, the Ninth
Circuit recently held that the petitioner's sentence under the Three Strikes law violated the
Eighth Amendment, Andrade v. Attorney General, 270 F3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001).
10. See Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes: Can we Return to Rationality?, 87 J. CRaL L &
Cam 395 (1997); Vitiello, supra note 4.
11. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1652.
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evidence that the political process was skewed.
Aggrieved father Mike Reynolds, along with the help of three
state court judges, drafted the original Three Strikes law after a
career criminal murdered Reynolds' daughter. 2 Reynolds secured
financial backing from both the NRA and the California Corrections
and Peace Officers Association. 13 However, despite the backing of
those two organizations, Reynolds' efforts to get the legislation
passed went nowhere, as: did his efforts to qualify the legislation as
a ballot initiative. 14
That was the case until Richard Allen Davis, a violent career
criminal, kidnapped Polly Klaas.'5 The twelve-year old girl's fate
was unknown for a month, during which her parents were able to
make her story news across the country. In an effort to bring the
child home safely, Polly's parents used a videotape of the girl to
keep her in the public spotlight. 6 Polly's kidnapping gave Reynolds'
efforts the boost it needed to get the Three Strikes legislation on
the ballot. Initially, Polly's father, Marc Klaas, signed Reynolds'
petition. 7 Later, he disavowed his support of Reynolds' legislation,
and argued that it provided too much punishment in some cases
and not enough in other cases. 8 Prior to Polly's kidnapping,
Reynolds secured only 20,000 signatures. Within days of the report
of her murder, Reynolds gathered an additional 50,000 signatures
and Three Strikes was "on its way to becoming the fastest
qualifying voter initiative in California's history." 9
At the same time, Pete Wilson, an unpopular governor facing a
difficult re-election campaign, seized on crime and Three Strikes as
his primary campaign issue.20 But the Democrats, often burned for
being soft on crime, refused to yield that issue to Wilson. Despite
doubts of politicians like Willie Brown, virtually no politician was
21
willing to oppose efforts to secure passage of Three Strikes.
In addition to Reynolds' version of Three Strikes, the California
Legislature had before it several other crime bills that were less
sweeping than Three Strikes.2 For example, the California District
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 1654.
Id. at 1655.
Id.
Id.
Vitiello, supm note 4, at 1654-55.
Id. at 1656.
Id. at 1659-60.
Id. at 1656.
Id. at 1660.
Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1671-73.
Vitiello, supra note 10, at 412-21 (discussing the various bills).
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Attorneys Association initially presented a more modest bill.-3 But
the legislature, controlled by the Democrats, played a game of high
stakes poker with Wilson and announced that it would pass a/ of
the bills and leave it to Wilson to decide which to sign. 2A In March
of 1994, Wilson, who began his campaign by promising to support
Reynolds' bill as part of a speech that he gave at Polly Klaas'
funeral, 25 reiterated his support for that bill despite available
alternatives. 26 Reynolds, who was unwilling to support any
proposed changes to the Three Strikes measure, 27 continued the
initiative process despite his success in the legislature and
promises to abandon those efforts. 28
Furthermore, despite evidence to the contrary, almost everyone
involved in the debate asserted that violent crime was on the rise.
In fact, crime rates had begun to decline before passage of Three
Strikes. 29
Even a quick look at the history of the enactment of the Three
Strikes legislation reveals the dissimilarities between that process
and normal legislative give and take. Three Strikes represents a
radical departure from traditional criminal law policy in a number
of important ways. Despite what Zinring et al. demonstrate was
"the largest penal experiment in American history,"3° the bill flew
through the legislature without careful assessment.3 ' The bill did
not undergo amendment during debate 32 and serious doubts about
the cost of the legislation were ignored 3 3 Reynolds, a private
citizen, held extraordinary sway over professional legislators and
made clear that he would wield that power against anyone who did
not completely support his bill. 4 Finally, the events surrounding
Polly's kidnapping turned-up political pressure to do something
about violent crime to such a degree that you were either against
crime, in which case you supported Three Strikes, or you were soft
on crime.
My conclusion that the public and our politicians spurned
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

ZIMRING gr AL, supra note 2, at 6.
Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1671-72.
Id. at 1660.
Id. at 1670, 1673.
Id. at 1658-59.
Vitiello, supra note 10, at 414.
ZIMRING Er A.L, supra note 2, at 87-88.
Id. at Chapter 2, entitled "The Largest Penal Experiment in American History."
Id. at 11-12.
Vitiello, supra note 10, at 413-14.
Id. at 415-22.
Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1658-59.
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rational debate is supported by further and more compelling
evidence. First, I want to recount a conversation that I have had
with a number of intelligent people at different times since passage
of Three Strikes. The conversation has taken slightly different form
over time, but the conversation goes something like this. A student,
friend, or acquaintance asks a question about Three Strikes, often
in response to news articles about the topic. I pose a hypothetical
and ask, "did you vote for Three Strikes and did you realize that
you were approving a sentence of twenty yearsas to life for an
offender who committed two residential burglaries in his early
twenties and then, many years later, is charged with possession of
marijuana?" The respondents are almost universally shocked that
Three Strikes covers such situations.
The source of people's confusion is understandable. The
campaign in support of passage of Three Strikes made outrageously
misleading claims about what the legislation aimed to do. 36 For
example, Three Strikes, according to campaign literature, was
aimed at rapists, murderers, and child molesters.3 7 While rapists
and child molesters may well be Three Strikes defendants, Three
Strikes does far more than that. As demonstrated by Zinring et al.,
violent criminals represent a small number of Three Strike
defendants. Instead, Three Strikes is used far more often against
burglars, thieves, drug offenders, and other non-violent offenders
than against violent felons. as Prosecutors may use Three Strikes
against murderers, but one doubts that Three Strikes serves much
purpose in murder cases, at least in cases where a prosecutor
seeks the death penalty.39 That is, penalties for murder are typically
more severe, or at least potentially so, than the penalties provided
under the Three Strikes legislation.
Campaign literature also claimed that "3 Strikes Saves Lives and
Taxpayers Dollars."40 However, the study relied on in making this
claim contained serious methodological flaws that overstated the
35. The minimum sentence is 25 years, but an offender may earn up to a 2096 reduction
in the sentence. CAL PENAL CODE § 667(c)(5) (West 2000).
36. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1677-88.
37. CAUFORNiA BALLOT PAMPHiLr, General Election, Nov. 8, 1994, at 36.
38. ZMNG ET AL, supra note 2, at 50. Specifically, the authors found that "[iln the
sample of more than 1,300 cases, burglary or drug offenses are twice as likely to be the
precipitating charge for a mandatory 25-year-to-life sentence as are all of the violent offenses
in the California penal code combined" and concluded that "[miore than 75% of the Three
Strikes defendants in [the studied] sample would face a 25-year minimum sentence for a
current nonviolent offense." Id.
39. The maximum penalty under Three Strikes is a term of life in prison as compared
with the possibility of the imposition of the death penalty in some murder cases.
40. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1678.
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benefits of Three Strikes. The Governor's chief economist prepared
a study that both overstated the number of crimes prevented by
Three Strikes and the cost of those savings. 4' His claim that Three
Strikes would result in each offender committing between 20 and
150 fewer crimes was inaccurate at the time 42 and, as Punishment
and Democracy demonstrates, was a gross overstatement of the
amount of crime curtailed by Three Strikes. 43
In addition, the report grossly overestimated the savings resulting
from Three Strikes. Three Strikes has netted mostly non-violent
offenders, guilty of theft and other non-violent crimes.44 Even if a
thief would have committed 10 thefts in a year at the national
average of $370 per theft, 45 society saves only $3,700 per year by
incarcerating the thief, but pays well in excess of $20,000 per year
to warehouse the offender.46 If the offender were a burglar,
committing 10 burglaries, each costing the national average of
$1400 per burglary, 47 society saves $14,000, again a net loss. If
Three Strikes in fact led to incarcerating violent offenders, te
savings would be much greater. However, Three Strikes has not led
to incarcerating large numbers of violent offenders, but instead, has
4
netted a large number of non-violent offenders. 8
The report also ignored alternatives to incarceration. It
considered only the cost of crime and incarceration and argued
that the cost of crimes committed was far greater than the cost of
imprisoning an offender. It did not compare the cost of responses
other than imprisonment, 49 despite the fact that less expensive
programs, including intensive supervision, have shown good
results.5° Due to the lack of opposition to Three Strikes, most of
these extravagant and flagrantly misleading statements went
51
uncontested.
In light of a record of gross overestimation of the benefits of
41.
(1998).
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 1673-85; see also ELworr CURRIE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 68-72
Id.
ZMmRING ET AL, supra note 2, at 101-02.
Id. at 50.

45. CuRnI, supra note 41, at 72 (stating that the average money loss per theft is $270
plus an additional $100 in police and court costs).
46. Id. at 67 (estimating that it costs between $16,000 and $25,000 per year to
incarcerate a felon).
47. Id. at 72.
48. ZIMRING Er AL, supra note 2, at 50.

49. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1684.
50. CURRIE, supra note 41, at 78-79. See also CURRIE, supra note 41, at Chapters 3-5
(discussing specific alternatives to incarceration).
51. Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1678.
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Three Strikes, the lack of debate despite ample evidence of Three
Strikes' excesses, the lack of political courage on the part of
important political players, and the political strong arm tactics used
by the proponents of Three Strikes, one wonders what is "frantic"
about my characterization of the process whereby Three Strikes
was adopted. Janiskee and Erler are silent on that point.52
Insofar as they contend that I lack trust in the democratic
process in this particular instance, I concur. But the fact that they
do not seemed troubled by the results of an election in which
voters were flagrantly misled is surprising. They make no effort to
show that Three Strikes, in fact, has fulfilled promises like the
promise to target rapists, murderers and child molesters. They do
not demonstrate that Three Strikes is worth its cost.
On the question whether they believe that Three Strikes deters
crime, the authors make conflicting statements. In their
introduction, they contend only that they criticize Zimring's
findings, but that they "do not undertake to demonstrate that Three
Strikes does deter crime."5 Later in the article, they claim far more
boldly, "[w]e have proven ... from the above data, that a distinCt
and sharp decline did indeed occur after the Three Strikes
legislation went into effect."5 They conclude, less modestly than in
their introduction, that "[firom all available evidence it seems clear
beyond cavil that Three Strikes is . . . an effective deterrent to
crime ... ."5 Even if they are correct that Three Strikes is an
effective deterrent, that does not respond to the issue of whether
the process whereby Three Strikes came into existence
demonstrates the absence of rational debate. Punishment and
Democracy and Professor Zimring's research more than amply
demonstrate the fallacy of their position that Three Strikes is an
effective deterrent. At best, the co-authors must concede that the
debate in support of Three Strikes did not focus on the deterrent
52. Janiskee and Erler, supra note 1, at 54-56. After characterizing opponents of Three
Strikes as "somewhat frantic," Janiskee and Erler describe Zimring's position, and my
position, and then comments that "[u]ntil the rule of experts replaces democracy, however,
radical reformers are confined by the forms of democracy." Id. Nowhere do the authors
attempt to dispute the detailed history that I developed to support my conclusion that "...
extravagant rhetoric prevented the electorate from making a fully informed decision on
'three strikes'." Vitiello, supra note 4, at 1625. At a minimum, I would like to see them make
some plausible, coherent argument in support of their "conclusion" that my argument was
"somewhat frantic." I would be interested to see a defense of extravagant claims made
during the election. Perhaps, the co-authors think that all is fair in trying to win an election,
and that voters are not entitled to a full and fair discussion of the issues before them.
53. Id. at 44.
54. Id. at 54.
55. Id. at 65.
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effect of the law, but instead, the promise of decreased crime was
premised on the effect of incapacitating high rate offenders.66
Further, nowhere do the authors attempt a defense of the
extravagant claims made during the election.

III. A

GOVERNMENT OF EXPERTS AND RADICAL REFORMERS

The co-authors also contend that Zimring and I are "radical
reformers."57 Their evidence of our radical agenda is that we appear
to favor insulating penal policy from the electorate. They conclude
that "[u]ntil the rule of experts replaces democracy, however,
radical reformers are confined by the forms of democracy."5
Recognize that the co-authors are making two distinct claims.
First, they claim that Ziruing and I favor insulating penal policy
from the electorate. Second, they believe that removing decisions
like penal policy from the electorate is inconsistent with our
democracy. Each point requires a separate response.
In my articles on Three Strikes, I did not take the position that
penal policy should routinely be insulated from normal democratic
processes. Instead, as discussed above, I focused on how
inadequate the process was in enacting Three Strikes. Elsewhere,
whether the issue has been passage of Proposition 215 (authorizing
use of medical marijuana) or Proposition 209 (eliminating
affirmative action in public employment, education and
contracting), I have raised questions about the fairness of the
process, in part, because of misleading campaign literature and
advertisements.9 But until I read Punishment and Democracy, I
56. Janiskee and Erler's precise position is a bit hard to grasp on this point. They fault
Zimring for focusing on deterrence because, according to Janiskee and Erler, "[tihe principal
conclusion of Zinuing is that the Three Strikes legislation fails to provide any measurable
deterrent effect on the target groups. In coming to this conclusion, Zimring violates the first
principle of policy analysis - that any law or policy must be understood in terms of its
intent." Id. at 50. As Zimring's response to Janiskee and Erler indicates, shortly after Three
Strikes went into effect, before any decline in the crime rate could have resulted from
increased incarceration, Three Strikes proponents switched the explanation for its claimed
effect on the crime rate by claiming that the decline was caused by deterrence. See Zinuing
and Kamin Rebuttal, Facts, Fallacies, and California's Three Strikes, 40 DUQ. L REv
(forthcoming June 2002). Apart from that question, the authors' sharp attack on Zintring is
an implicit admission that the Three Strikes law was sold as a law that would incapacitate
dangerous offenders and that would result in the dramatic decline in crime.
57. Janiskee and Erler, supra note 1, at 56.
58. Id.
59. Michael Vitiello, Proposition 215: De Facto Legalization of Pot and the
Shortcomings of Direct Democracy, 31 U. MICH. J. OF LAW REFoRM 707, 713-17 (1998)
(discussing the misleading campaign supporting passage of Proposition 215); Michael Vitiello
and Andrew J. Glendon, Article I Judge and the Initiative Process: Are Article III Judges
Hopelessly Elitist?, 31 Loy. L.A L REv. 1275, 1301-02 (1998) (raising questions about the

2002

Response to Crime, Punishment and Romero

had not considered the special need to insulate punishment
questions from voters. Punishment and Democracy makes a
compelling argument that we would be better served by insulating
those decisions from direct democracy. I highly recommend that
text and urge the reader to make her own decision about whether
we end up with excessive, and unduly expensive, punishment when
we do not insulate penal policy decisions from the electorate.60
Further, I question whether suggesting that not all policy
decisions be made by the voters is a radical reform. The co-authors
seem to be engaging in name calling without attempting. to make a
serious case in support of their "conclusion" that Zimring and I are
radical in our views. Even the briefest review of basic Civics
demonstrates that our political process routinely insulate numerous
policy decisions from popular democracy.
As discussed in Punishment and Democracy, every Western
democracy insulates monetary policy from popular control.6 1 In the
United States, we have relied on the Federal Reserve system since
1913.62 One justification for the decision to insulate monetary policy
from the electorate is that democratically responsive institutions
produce undesirable levels of inflation. Supporters of the Federal
Reserve system cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be called
radical reformers, especially in an era in which Federal Reserve
Chairman Greenspan has been credited with the largest economic
expansion in American history.
A quick look at the United States Constitution and other
institutions in American government rebuts the co-authors'
suggestion that direct democracy is the norm and that departure
from that norm is radical. James Madison's distrust of mob rule is
woven into any number of constitutional provisions64 For example,
Article HI creates an independent judiciary, in part, to insulate
judges' decisions from the political process. The Constitution
creates the Electoral College,65 which, as the 2000 Presidential
election demonstrates, can lead to the election of ,a president
without a majority of the national vote. The Presidential veto,66 the
voters' intent in passing Proposition 209).
60. While the entire text presents compelling reading, Part IV, beginning at 149, makes
an especially compelling case with regard to the role of popular democracy in crime policy.
61. ZpmING ET AL, supra note 2, at 204.

62. Id.
63. Id. at 205.
64. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (explaining that the republican form of
government avoids the evils of factions and the tyranny of the majority).
65. U.S. CONST. art. H, § 1, cl. 2; U.S. CONST., amend. XII.
66.

U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
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super-majority required to amend the Constitution, 67 and the
Senate 68 itself are all examples of constitutional provisions that are
contrary to popular democracy. Other institutions and rules
underscore the ways in which our government limits the popular
will. The filibuster, allowed under Senate rules, is one obvious
example. Allowing committee chairmen to prevent legislation or a
candidate's name to get to the Senate floor is another example of a
system that has ingrained checks on popular democracy.
Often the drafters placed a specific power in a particular branch
of government because they wanted to insulate that power from
the most representative branch of government. For example,
conducting foreign affairs is largely entrusted to the President. 69
The House of Representatives is more representative of the will of
the people than is the President - for example, representatives
must receive more votes than their opponents, unlike the President,
who is elected by the Electoral College, not directly by the people.
Further, representatives must run for reelection every two, instead
of four years. Despite the closer connection between the House
and the people, no one would seriously argue in favor of placing
the power to conduct foreign affairs in the House rather than in the
executive branch. 70
The decision to entrust a particular power with a given branch of
government is often a matter of expertise and efficiency. For
example, according to the Supreme Court, the President, "not
Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries. . . . He has his confidential
sources of information. . . . Secrecy in respect of information
gather by [diplomatic, consular and other officials] may be highly
necessary and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful
71
results."
One could examine a wide range of constitutional powers and
find similar reasons why the drafters deemed one branch or
another to be the appropriate repository of a particular powers.
U.S. CONST. art. V.
U.S. CONST. art. I, §3, cl. 1.
69. "[Tlhe President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the
nation.. . . As Marshall said in his great argument of March 7, 1800, in the House of
Representatives, 'Mhe President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and
its sole representative with foreign nations.'" United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
70. No doubt Congress has a role to play in international affairs. It has power over the
" U.S. CONSr. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. It may declare
"Power to provide for the common Defense,.
war and to raise an army and navy. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 11-13.
71. Curtiss-Wright Export Co., 299 U.S. at 320.
67.
68.
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Often, the reason for placing a power in a particular branch was
confidence in that branch's expertise, as in the example of foreign
affairs. Placing a power in the hands of the many, whether in the
House or directly in the hands of the people, is often inappropriate.
Whether determining criminal punishment is the kind of exercise
of power better left to experts and removed from political forefront
is a debatable proposition. As with the previous example,
conducting foreign affairs, presumably where strong policies
support insulating an area of power from the popular will, we get
better government when we do so.
State governments are similarly structured to place limits on the
involvement of the electorate. The obvious, but common, exception
is the initiative process, which allows direct participation of the
electorate in passing legislation.
Does the fact that California has a provision for direct voter
participation mean that criticism of that system is radical? Whether
one is a fan of direct democracy often depends on the results of
the most recent election. For example, some politicians showed
considerably less enthusiasm for the will of the people after
passage of Proposition 215 than they did after passage of Three
Strikes.72 More importantly, main line scholars of all stripes have
raised serious questions about direct democracy.73 I will not
reiterate all of those concerns here, but merely note again the
primary concern that I raised above, that voters are often seriously
misled about the nature of the choice in any given election.
Above, I argued that the framers made conscious choices to
insulate some akeas of governmental power from the most
representative branch. In arguing whether such decisions were
justified, one would focus on whether sound policies support the
decision. In a republican form of government, we do not simply
assume that the people should be immediately involved in
decision-making. By analogy, we can argue whether placing
decisions concerning criminal punishment in the hands of the
electorate is sound by comparing how well the electorate or
politicians or experts have performed. For example, empirical data
72. See Vitiello and Glendon, supra note 59, at 1285-86 (comparing Governor Wilson
and Attorney General Lungren's differing support of the will of the people depending on
whether the issue was three strikes or Proposition 215).
73. See, e.g., J. Clark Kelso, California's Constitutional Right to Privacy, 19 PEPP. L
REv. 327, 338-44 (1992) (raising concerns about the initiative process). Justice Hans Linde
has gone further and suggested that the initiative process may violate the United States
constitutional guarantee of a republican form of government. See Hans Linde, State Courts
and Republican Government, 41 SANTA CLARA L REv. 951 (2001).
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may educate the debate to help us assess whether the electorate
has performed well in developing penal policy. That, of course, is
exactly what Punishment and Democracy examined. Zimring and
his co-authors demonstrated that both the politicians and the
people did not do a very good job at assessing punishment, and
that we are spending far too much for far too few benefits.
Janiskee and Erler argue to the contrary that the Zimring study
did not demonstrate that Three Strikes is ineffective. The reader
can examine the Zimring study, the critique of that study, and
Zimring's response. I am convinced by the Zimring study and
argument in Punishment and Democracy that we would make
better use of public funds by insulating punishment decisions from
the political arena. The argument for doing so is hardly radical; it is
the same kind of arguments that framers considered when
distributing power in different branches of government in our
republican form of government.
IV.

PARTING THOUGHTS

Elsewhere, I have expressed concern about the problems that
Three Strikes has created for California- 74 Among other difficulties,
prolonged incarceration for many Three Strikes offenders is an
unnecessarily expensive solution to the crime problem. An aging
prison population that includes many non-violent offenders cannot
be justified by gains in public safety.7 5 Data is mounting that Three
Strikes is not going to deliver reasonable benefits.76 But reform can
occur only if the legislature can achieve a super-majority to modify
the law. Our best hope is that serious minded scholars and others
interested in sound public policy can engage in reasoned discourse.
If Janiskee and Erler want to be part of the debate, they have to do
a better job.

74. Vitiello, supra note 10 passim.
75. Id. at 437-41.
76. See, e.g., ZIMRING Err AL., supra note 2, at Chapter 6; see also id. at 102-03 (citing
other studies reaching conclusions consistent with the Zimring study).

